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FROM FOOTNOTE TO FOOTPRINT: OBERGEFELL’S CALL TO 
RECONSIDER IMMIGRATION LAW AS FAMILY LAW  
Kari Hong* 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 40-year debate over whether marriage would be conferred to same-sex 
couples, conservative scholars lauded the institution of marriage and many liberal 
scholars were skeptical of the emphasis on and importance of the institution.  In June 
2015, Obergefell v. Hodges unequivocally established that same-sex couples have a 
fundamental right to marry.1  Although the decision is a landmark case for LGBT 
equality, Obergefell did not resolve the underlying debate over the continuing purpose of 
the State remaining involved in the institution of marriage. 
This chapter is an engagement with the Obergefell decision to suggest one way in 
which the decision’s articulation of the citizen’s relationship with the government (or ‘the 
State,’ as is the preferred nomenclature among some) is quite groundbreaking. American 
law—and American values—has a mythical and actual embrace of privacy as a valued 
and near-inviolable right. The belief that American citizens have a zone of privacy, a 
right to remain free from government intervention, has captured the imagination of both 
liberals and conservatives when embracing the rights to abortion, family planning, and 
gun ownership. However, instead of recognizing the harm that the State can have when 
intruding on a citizen’s fundamental right, Obergefell is predicated upon a recognition 
that some harms—such as humiliation—are inflicted when the State fails to intervene and 
recognize a same-sex couple (and their child) as a family.  In a pointed exchange between 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Roberts’ dissent, Justice Roberts 
criticizes Obergefell’s new formulation of privacy to serve as an affirmative rights for a 
citizen to receive benefits from the State (instead of simply the guarantee to be let alone).   
Obergefell’s remarkable anointment of privacy as a guarantor of rights is a major 
departure from the position widely accepted before 2000, and this chapter asks how this 
newly minted right—or “Obergefell’s sword” as phrased by Justice Roberts—might be 
applied to families in which some members are U.S. citizens and some are not.  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAMILIES AND THE RIGHT FOR FUNCTIONING 
FAMILIES TO BE LET ALONE 
Traditionally, privacy has been viewed as a valued commodity.  As Justice Brandeis 
articulated 100 years ago, the Founders ‘undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.’2  From Man’s right to control his home and destiny, American life has been 
imbued with a sense that an individual’s right to privacy is a precondition to achieving 
                                                 
* Kari Hong, Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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freedoms and liberties.3  The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments reinforce the 
idea that the right to be left alone from the State remains a vital, contemporary protection 
we receive from our democratic institutions.4   
It was not long before Woman, such as Catherine MacKinnon, wryly observed 
that the right of privacy might also become ‘a right of men “to be let alone” to oppress 
women one at a time.’5  Marital rape, domestic violence, and child abuse required 
reexamining the extent to which the ideology of privacy ‘obscure[ed] and foster[ed] 
inequality and exploitation.’6 Despite these concerns, the privacy doctrine did very much 
benefit women and family units.  In keeping with Justice Brandeis’ promise, the Supreme 
Court recognized that constitutional provisions prevented the State from intruding upon 
familial decisions relating to procreation,7 abortion,8 child-rearing,9 and family 
formation.10 
As many have observed, the contemporary reality is that functional—and 
presumed functioning—families are let alone by the state.  A family that possesses either 
a Man or Money may raise its children with as much confusion and chaos as it pleases.  It 
                                                 
3 See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a 
decision upholding the government’s collection of evidence by wiretapping, Justice Brandeis observed that 
“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that 
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as 
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must 
be deemed a violation of the Fifth.”). See also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to 
Privacy’, Harv. L. Rev. 4, 1890, 193, 205  (in articulating the ‘right to be left alone,’ Warren and Brandeis 
observed that ‘the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the 
medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the 
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone.’). 
4 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (in holding that 
the NSA’s collection of telephone metadata exceeded statutory authority, the Court opined that: ‘We must 
confront the question whether a surveillance program that the government has put in place to protect 
national security is lawful. That program involves the bulk collection by the government of telephone 
metadata created by telephone companies in the normal course of their business but now explicitly required 
by the government to be turned over in bulk on an ongoing basis. As in the 1970s, the revelation of this 
program has generated considerable public attention and concern about the intrusion of government into 
private matters. As in that era, as well, the nation faces serious threats to national security, including the 
threat of foreign-generated acts of terrorism against the United States. Now, as then, Congress is tasked in 
the first instance with achieving the right balance between these often-competing concerns.’) 
5 Catharine MacKinnon, ‘Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology’, in Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessy 
(eds), Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives  45, 53, Amherst: Univ. Of Massachusets Press, 1984, cited 
in M. Fineman, ‘What Place for Family Privacy?’, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 67, 1999, 1207, 1217 (discussing 
feminist critiques of the privacy doctrine). 
6 Fineman, note 5 above at 1216. 
7 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
8 Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). 
9 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
10 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1991); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 484 (1977) (extending 
familial protects protections afforded to caretakers to grandparents raising children). 
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is only the disruption of divorce,11 poverty,12 and abuse13 that invites—and compels—the 
State to intervene.   
But what if it is not the State intervention that is in fact the problem?  Stated 
another way, what if the problem of regulating, policing, and punishing public families 
arises from the biases seeking conformity to a normative ideals but not the vehicle of 
State intervention, standing by itself?  I will return to this question after noting the 
transformative nature of Obergefell’s conception of harm arising from a State’s failure to 
intervene in the zone of privacy. 
OBERGEFELL’S SWORD: RETHINKING STATE HARM AS ARISING FROM 
NO STATE INTERVENTION  
Much has been written about the triad of Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
and Roe v. Wade, but the right to privacy has taken on new qualities in the marriage 
equality movement. Beginning in Lawrence v. Texas, it was the right to be let alone that 
paved the way for Obergefell’s recognition of same-sex marriage.  Lawrence begins with 
the precise pronouncement that ‘Liberty protects the person from unwarranted 
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is 
not omnipresent in the home.’14  It is this predicate formulation of privacy that leads to 
the abolition of state laws criminalizing what is otherwise consensual, intimacy between 
adults.   
Twelve years later, when establishing that marriage is a fundamental right that 
must be conferred to same-sex couples, Obergefell cited to Lawrence a dozen times to 
support its reasoning and result.15  But importantly, Obergefell articulated a new intrusion 
of the State, which is not regulation or punishment of private choices.  Rather, the harm 
inflicted on those from whom marriage is withheld is ‘the imprimatur of the State itself 
on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.’16   
Privacy is no longer a carved out realm, a space apart from the State’s views in 
which individuals may order their lives in peace.  Rather, Justice Kennedy articulates a 
                                                 
11 See M.A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, 
New York: Routledge, 1995 (defining ‘public families’ as those in which the mother-father-child triad is 
missing, specifically, when a man is absent from a family, the family is subject to surveillance, regulation, 
and punishment). 
12 Khiara Bridges, ‘Privacy Rights and Public Families’, Harv. J. L. & Gender 24, 2011, 113, 118–19  (‘[I]t 
is poor women’s and families’ poverty that subjects them to the suspension of the rights to privacy. . . . 
[T]he reliance on the welfare state (for medical services or otherwise) makes ‘public’ even the family that 
has managed to fulfill heteronormative ideals.’). 
13 Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a civil right challenge to a state’s records of 
suspect child abusers on the basis that the plaintiff parents ‘have not demonstrated a violation of any federal 
constitutional or statutory right of familial privacy. The confines of that right were not so clearly 
established that, even if Defendants' acts did impinge the Hodge family's zone of privacy, they could 
objectively or reasonably have known that their conduct violated the Due Process Clause.’). 
14 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
15 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
16 Ibid. 
  4 
privacy right that demands that the State remove itself from public expressions that 
inflicts humiliation and stigmatization onto others.  In so doing, the State then must 
arbitrate values and affirmatively protect those who are vulnerable to non-legal and 
intangible injuries.  The State suddenly becomes a guarantor of affirmative benefits. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts strongly objects to Obergefell’s new 
definition of privacy.  In objecting to the conclusion that recognition of same-sex 
marriage is required by the constitution, he observes that ‘[n]either Lawrence nor any 
other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert 
here.’17  Justice Roberts notes that ‘[u]nlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and 
sodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion.  They create no 
crime and impose no punishment.  Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to 
engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit.  No one is 
“condemned to live in loneliness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one.’18 
Justice Roberts affirms that ‘the laws [limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples] in no 
way interfere with the “right to be let alone.”’19  To again emphasize the perceived break 
that Obergefell makes from prior precedent, ‘petitioners do not seek privacy.  Quite the 
opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding 
government benefits.  Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the 
shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements 
from the State.’20  
Obergefell is important because for the first time, the privacy doctrine is no longer 
a means to let people alone.  The harm imposed on same-sex couples by the State is not 
the harm envisioned by Justice Brandeis.  It was not an unwanted intervention in the 
sacred realm that caused injury, but rather, the State’s lack of intervention that inflicted 
the harm on the couple.  Under the guise of privacy, State intervention then becomes a 
powerful tool to obtain needed benefits and protections.   
EXTENDING OBERGEFELL’S SWORD TO IMMIGRATION 
Predicated on the Obergefell’s proactive privacy right, I explore then how State 
intervention can be a means to create more public families and more families subject to 
State intervention.   
It seems counterintuitive to want this.  Why would anyone want to invite the State 
into their personal affairs, casting judgments on, and policing conduct relating to what 
they should or should be doing?  But the reality is that many private families, individuals 
who are fully functioning, are in need of the benefits of State intervention that are 
currently only provided to public families, those who are subject to government policing 
and supervision.  To provide two concrete examples in the immigration context, the 
parent/child relationship and marriage illustrate how State intervention is a 
counterintuitive means to protect the harm facing certain families. 
                                                 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
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Rethinking Immigration Law As Family Law 
Family law can—and should—have a transformative impact on how Congress 
recognizes and defines which family members will be admitted into the country.  I am not 
the first person to make such a suggestion.  To the contrary, there is a significant and 
growing conversation of scholars who are exploring the intersection of family and 
immigration law—Famigration, if you will—and highlighting such areas how child 
custody determinations are shaped by immigration status21 and how immigration status is 
conferred (and restricted) based on the parent-child and marital relationships.22  Scholars 
are also engaging in a vital normative discussion, positing how family law can alter some 
procedural protections and substantive aspects of immigration law.  ‘Thinking of 
immigration law as family law . . . reveals the extent to which it is out of step with deeply 
held societal values and, in some instances, constitutional principles.’23    
The bold attempt to reform U.S. immigration policies with the judicial tools of 
substantive due process or family law’s best interests of the child defining doctrine is not 
unthinkable.  Other countries have relied on family law doctrines to stop the deportation 
of a child’s parents.  Both Australia and Canada require a deportation proceeding against 
a non-citizen parent to consider the impact that any state action would have on the best 
interests of the parent’s child, as that term is defined by international treaties.24  Although 
not yet recognized by U.S. courts, the conversations about Famigration are timely and 
                                                 
21 David B. Thronson, ‘Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law As Federal Family Law in 
the Context of Child Custody’, Hastings L.J. 59, 2008,  453, 510, 512–13  (“When a parent's unauthorized 
status is the result of an immigration system that fails to take the best interests of children into account and 
denies agency to children, incorporating consideration related to and arising from the parent's status would 
validate not only immigration law's conclusion about the parent's status but also the premises and system 
that led to that conclusion.’); Kerry Abrams, ‘Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child 
Standard’, Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 14, 2006, 87, 88 (‘What this essay does do is to identify the analytic 
problems with the Rico court's treatment of immigration status, and to use the case as an opportunity to 
consider how courts and legislatures could improve the way in which they consider immigration status in 
child custody cases.’). 
22 Shani M. King, ‘U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward A 
Functional Definition of Family That Protects Children's Fundamental Human Rights’, Colum. Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 41, 2010, 509, 513; Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An 
Immigration Tug of War Between States and Their Supra-National Associations’, Geo. Immigr. L.J. 25, 
2011, 807, 816; Bridgette A. Carr, ‘Incorporating A "Best Interests of the Child" Approach into 
Immigration Law and Procedure’, Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 12, 2009, 120, 123–24, 159. 
23 Thronson, note 21 above at 510; Carr, note 22 above at 159 (querying how the best interests of the child 
doctrine can be employed in the asylum and hardship contexts to recognize the interests of a child in the 
adjudication of a non-citizen parent’s immigration status). 
24 See Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 289 (Austl.) 
(holding that the phrase ‘actions concerning children’ encompasses a parent's immigration proceeding, 
particularly where the parent's primary argument involves the hardship to his or her children); Baker v. 
Canada [1999], 2 S.C.R. 817 (holding that the Convention's ‘best interests of the child’ principle was 
relevant to interpreting the deportation statute, despite the lower court's holding that ‘deportation of a 
parent was not a decision “concerning” children within the meaning of [A]rticle 3’ of the Convention). 
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urgent.  In the light of the fact that 18 years have passed without meaningful immigration 
reform, searching in family law for potential remedies is not at all a misplaced journey.25  
In the United States, immigration law began and operated as an arm of foreign 
policy.  From the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Cold War’s encouragement of defectors, 
Congress determined which nationals were excluded and which ones were embraced.  
Federal courts, through the plenary power doctrine, permitted Congress to make its 
immigration policies without interference on what it viewed as sensitive matters of 
international relations.  But immigration law cannot be viewed as simply a part of 
international diplomacy.  Since the 1980s, the (purported) civil proceedings of 
immigration law began to police, detain, and criminalize some of the non-citizens who 
lived in the United States. Crimmigration scholars named these pernicious forces and 
responded by calling for extra constitutional protections found in criminal law to be 
imported to immigration courts.  Padilla v. Kentucky—the Supreme Court’s 2010 case 
anouncing that a criminal defense attorney’s effective representation must include 
providing a non-citizen client with accurate information about the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction—is the most recognizable success of these 
efforts.26    
It is undeniable that immigration law is family law.  It is no exaggeration to say 
that immigration law is family law.  Under present policies, two-thirds of all legal 
immigrants receive status through a family relationship.27  Congress has prioritized 
family unity by permitting the spouses and children of citizens to enter the country and 
receive residence without wait times or numerical limitations.28  Children born to citizen 
parents receive birthright citizenship.29  
                                                 
25 In 1996, Congress passed Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996) (IIRIRA).  IIRIRA significantly altered the nature of immigration 
law by focusing on restricting and limiting those who are eligible for relief.  In a dramatic break from the 
modern immigration laws, first established in 1952, IIRIRA has relied on numerous procedural and 
substantive changes to exclude a large number of non-citizens who had otherwise been eligible to remain in 
the United States.  For instance, those with minor, and even serious, criminal convictions who had been 
eligible to remain in the country are no longer able to do so. . . . The current crimes are also retroactive in 
effect, which means that many individuals who were convicted and served their sentences years ago, are 
newly vulnerable to removal even though the offense did not have serious, or even any, immigration 
consequences at the date of the conviction.  Kari E. Hong, ‘Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration 
Courts, and Derivative Citizenship’, Geo. Immigr. L.J. 28, 2014, 277, 310. 
26 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 365 (2010)  
27 USCIS statistics.  20% is from employment, 10% asylum, and rest from other remedies such as 
cancellation of removal. 
28 Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). 
29 This issue is made complex by Congress’s decision, in 1986, to change the derivative citizenship statute 
to require proof of a blood relationship between an unwed father and a child. See Immigration and 
Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1409(a)(1) (2012)). For children born after November 14, 1986, they must follow the requirement of this 
statute and establish a genetic link to any unwed father. For children born on or before November 14, 1986, 
a child may ‘elect to have the pre-amendment [8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)] apply,’ which required only 
legitimation before age 21. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 426 n.3 (1998).  There are numerous policy 
arguments to amend the statute and eliminate the dispositive nature of genetics in determining parentage. 
However, in a pernicious turn of events, immigration courts are interpreting the old law--that does not have 
a biology requirement-- to somehow implicitly incorporate the new statute’s blood requirement. See 
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Today’s immigrants are not simply those who (like my own grandparents and 
great-grandparents) were existing families of foreign nationals, emigrating together with 
their worldly belongings packed in one trunk propelling them to either Ellis or Angel 
Island.  Modern travel—and the Internet—has introduced a way in which love can 
transform an intended vacation into a serendipitous encounter in which a U.S. citizen will 
now seek to marry or parent a person who was born abroad.  As a result, many of today’s 
immigration decisions are not about foreign nationals.  To the contrary, the decision to 
order someone deported most often implicates the question of whether a citizen parent, 
child, or spouse will be separated from a loved one. 
 
Institutional Forces That Interfere With An Impartial Adjudication of Family Law 
In Immigration Court Proceedings 
Federalism in family law is a rich and controversial topic.  Some scholars 
embrace the supremacy of state family law,30 some articulate compelling arguments for 
federal uniformity,31 some argue that federal law has acted as an invisible hand in 
regulating some specific family law matters in the areas of taxation, immigration, and 
society security,32 and some debate whether family law federalism is in fact even real.33   
Understudied in these debates is a specific context in which the conflicting laws 
are resolved (or not resolved as the case may be).  Turning to immigration, for decades 
scholars have been investigating the myriad ways by which family law and immigration 
law overlap, diverge, and conflict with one another.34  But these inquiries overlook that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Martinez-Madera v. Holder, 559 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) where the petitioner was born in 1953, 
entitling him to the benefit of the pre-1986 statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the 
Ninth Circuit ruled against the petitioner because he was legitimated by his stepfather, without any blood 
relations, under California law. Of note, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the biological requirement based on its 
mistaken reliance on the post-1986 statute: Ibid. at 940, n.1. In oral argument in a different case, Judge 
Kimberly Wardlaw noted that mistake. Oral Argument at 13:33, Anderson v. Holder, 527 F. App’x 602 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
30 June Carbone, ‘Marriage As A State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the Expressive Interest in 
Family Law’, Mich. St. L. Rev. 2011, 49, 60 (‘With no clear method for determining to which community a 
particular marriage or family belonged, domestic relations law became preoccupied with convoluted 
problems in the conflict of laws. . . .At the same time, the compromise was struck at the state level because, 
as the last section established, family values have never been uniform enough to allow a national 
approach.’); Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 Yale J.L. & 
Feminism 221, 224 (2005). 
31 See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 1073, 1075 
(1994) 
32 See Anne L. Alstott, Commentary Family Values, Inheritance Law, and Inheritance Taxation, 63 Tax L. 
Rev. 123 (2009); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 Vand. L. 
Rev. 787, 792 (2008) 
33 Courtney G. Joslin, ‘Federalism and Family Status’, Ind. L.J. 90, 2015, 787, 814 (‘Perhaps one of the 
reasons that the myth of family law federalism is so resilient is that it appears to make things easier. . . . 
Once the myth of family law's inherent localism is dispelled, one is then left with a set of more complicated 
questions that, to date, have largely been overlooked. If Congress is not precluded from acting, should it 
act, and if so, when and how?’). 
34 David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law As Federal Family Law in 
the Context of Child Custody, 59 Hastings L.J. 453, 510, 512-13 (2008); Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration 
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immigration and citizenship law do not deploy a unique, federal definition of family law.  
To the contrary, since at least 1949, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—the 
agency tasked with interpreting immigration laws—has expressly deferred to state family 
law in determining various family relationships.35  
 In this respect, abstract discussions over whether the federal government has a 
legitimate disagreement with state law definitions of immigrant families glosses over 
salient, institutional problems that citizens and their non-citizen family members 
encounter: Rather than rendering a decision over a legal issue within their expertise, 
immigration judges have to grapple with the complexities of family law while facing 
political and workload pressures that favor removal for reasons quite other than the 
application of family law.36   
 
Unlike their federal court counterparts, immigration judges are handling nearly 
three times as many cases (1200 per year versus 480 per year processed by a district court 
judge) without the same level of clerical and administrative support.37  Immigration 
judges are tasked with applying the federal statutes and regulations governing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward A Functional Definition of Family That 
Protects Children's Fundamental Human Rights, 41 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 509, 513 (2010); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and America: An Immigration Tug of War Between States 
and Their Supra-National Associations, 25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 807, 816 (2011); Bridgette A. Carr, 
Incorporating A "Best Interests of the Child" Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 Yale 
Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 120, 123-24, 159 (2009)  
35 See, e.g., Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2000). When adjudicating a derivative citizenship 
claim, Judge Easterbrook observed that ‘federal law may point to state (or foreign) law as a rule of 
decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these terms.’ Ibid. at 799.  In deferring to 
state family law, the Ninth Circuit explained that ‘because there is no federal law of domestic relations, that 
necessarily means a separation recognized by state law .... [O]ur approach accords with the INS's long 
standing policy of looking to state law to determine questions of family relations, specifically marriage and 
custody’.  Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2005).. 
36 Robert Katzmann, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Immigration and the Courts, 
Remarks at Roundtable Discussion at the Brookings Institution 49 (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Brookings 
Institution Panel] (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/events/2009/2/20%20immigration/20080220_immigration.pdf) (‘[W]hile recognizing the real 
problems in the system, we shouldn't forget those immigration judges who are doing outstanding jobs, and, 
unfortunately, they get tarnished when there are these instances of those immigration judges who are not 
performing ....’). 
37 It is estimated that in 2013, 40% of individuals in immigration court did not have counsel. See Erin 
Kelley, ‘Immigration Judges Call for Reform’, USA Today (August 27, 2014, 5:58 PM), http:// 
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/27/immigrationjudgesreform/14704039/.  The 
immigration judges have a larger caseload with less help than their federal court counterparts. As of 2009, 
each immigration judge heard approximately 1200 cases each year, which requires the judge to hear and 
decide, on average, one hundred cases each month at a rate of five cases each day of the week. Such a 
degree of efficiency is unusual for courts. A federal district judge, by contrast, considers and decides 480 
cases each year, at a rate of forty cases each month and just over one case per day. In addition to the 
smaller number of cases, federal district courts have the benefit of at least two law clerks that assist each 
judge. In the immigration court system, four immigration judges share one law clerk. See Stephen H. 
Legomsky, ‘Restructuring Immigration Adjudication’, Duke L.J. 59, 2010, 1635, 1652; Dana Leigh Marks, 
‘An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court’, Bender's Immigr. 
Bull. 13, January 1 2008, 3, 14; Brookings Institution Panel, note 35 above, at 7–8 (statement of Russell 
Wheeler, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution). 
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immigration law, which is described as a highly technical area of law, unwieldy, 
complex, and dense.  When questions of state family law arise, the immigration judge is 
required to properly learn and apply a new area of law, which could arise from any of the 
50 states.  Although judges are capable of mastering new subjects and novel claims, the 
immigration judges must do so without the benefit of attorneys presenting the complex 
issues (40 per cent of immigrants do not have counsel).  Whereas a federal judge has at 
least two clerks to assist with research, four immigration judges share one clerk.38   
 
The government prosecuting attorneys (called trial attorneys) seeking the removal 
of a non-citizen are not necessarily invested in faithful—or accurate— applications of 
family law.  In derivative citizenship claims, a child who has been legitimated by a 
citizen parent—as that relationship is defined by state family law—is deemed a citizen at 
birth, even when if such determination happens when the person is now an adult.  When 
arguing that a man named Gary Anderson did not meet those definitions, the Ninth 
Circuit recently called out the Government’s attorney inconsistent and conflicting 
interpretation of state law: ‘In other words, the government's position is that the word 
“legitimation” should be read broadly when a broad reading results in the denial of 
citizenship, and narrowly when a narrow reading results in the denial of citizenship.’39  
Not only was the government attorney’s argument inconsistent (and irrational) in the case 
before it, but the Ninth Circuit noted that its interpretation of the state law ‘defies the 
government’s own prior assertion that the statute at issue in [three other cases that had 
been brought to federal courts].’40  Although this is but one example, the government 
attorney’s complete disregard for the right application of family law must give pause to 
making parallels to federalism questions in other fields in which there are questions of 
abstention, conflict of laws, and comity.41   
Unique to other administrative judges, immigration judges lack independence 
from the prosecutors arguing cases before them.42  The prosecutors appearing in 
immigration courts are employees of the Department of Justice and answer to the 
Attorney General.  Likewise, the label ‘judge’ in the title ‘immigration judge’ is a 
misnomer.  An immigration judge is in fact neither an Article I nor Article III judge.  
Rather, they are lawyers who also are employees of the Department of Justice.  The 
Attorney General is not a neutral arbiter between his employees (the prosecutor seeking 
removal and the immigration judge adjudicating a case).  Rather, the Attorney General 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Younger, Burford, Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815–16, 96 
S. Ct. 1236, 1245, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976); see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., ‘State Courts and the Making of 
Federal Common Law’, U. Pa. L. Rev. 153, 2005, 825, 845; Evan H. Caminker, ‘Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?’, Stan. L. Rev. 46, 1994, 817, 818  (‘[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that 
a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court “superior” to it.’); Frederic M. Bloom, 
‘State Courts Unbound’, Cornell L. Rev. 93, 2008, 501, 554. 
42 Dana Leigh Marks, ‘An Independent Immigration Court Is Needed’, Room for Debate, N.Y. Times (July 
12, 2011), http:// www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-the-asylum-system-be-fixed/an-
independent-immigration-court-is-needed (‘The National Association of Immigration Judges believes that 
establishment of an independent agency or Article I court (like the tax or bankruptcy courts) rather than the 
current placement of the courts within the Department of Justice, is an essential reform.’). 
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has issued regulations preventing immigration judges from holding prosecutors in 
contempt of court under the reasoning that the immigration judges are in fact DOJ 
lawyers on equal footing with the immigration court prosecutors.43  
 
The lack of independence of the immigration judge from the prosecutor is not 
hypothetical concern.  In the past, the job security of immigration judges has been 
conditioned on whether they are ordering enough people removed from the country.  In 
2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft, fired one-third of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) because their approval rates (permitting non-citizens to stay) were above 
the Board average.  (Not surprisingly, since 2002, the denial rate of the BIA rose from 59 
to 93 per cent.)44   
 
Any meaningful inquiry as to whether immigration law reaches different 
outcomes from family law over the meaning of “spouse,” “parent”, and “child” must then 
start with these institutional forces that distort adjudications of that very question. 
 
Rethinking State Intervention:  GALs As A Test Case 
 
The new immigrant family—being comprised of at least one citizen member—and the 
institutional forces in immigration law—that tip towards removal rather than faithfully 
applying family law—demand that immigration law no longer be left alone under the 
plenary powers doctrine.   
Returning to public families, much has been observed about the disparate 
treatment of intact, nuclear families versus the other families, made public through their 
perceived deviance of disruption.  Underlying these criticisms has been the assumption 
that State intervention has been to the public families’ disadvantage.  The unspoken 
assumption has been that a family’s right to be let alone is ultimately a desired state to 
which all families normatively should belong.  
But again, to ask the question asked before, what if it is not the State intervention 
that is in fact the problem?   
                                                 
43 ‘Immigration judges cannot hold federal prosecutors from the Department of Homeland Security in 
contempt of court because the judges are considered to be lawyers working for the Justice Department. . .’. 
Marks, note 41 above, at 3–4 (‘At present, the Attorney General, our nation's chief prosecutor in terrorism 
cases, acts as the boss of the judges who decide whether an accused non-citizen should be removed from 
the United States. At the same time, despite the creation of the DHS and the placement of trial-level 
immigration prosecutors there, the Attorney General continues to supervise a critical element of the 
prosecution process, the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL), which defends immigration cases on 
behalf of the government in the circuit courts of appeals. This conflict of interest between the judicial and 
prosecutorial functions creates a significant (and perhaps even fatal) flaw to the immigration court 
structure, one that is obvious to the public and undermines confidence in the impartiality of the courts.’). 
44 The Attorney General fired the BIA judges who had decided in favor of non-citizens at higher rates than 
the Board's average. See Brookings Institution Panel, note 35 above, at 22 (statement of Professor Andrew 
I. Schoenholtz, Georgetown University Law Center); see also Marks, note 41 above, at 14 (criticizing an 
internal Department of Justice investigation into immigration judges decisions because, ‘with the clear 
memory of the not-too-distant personnel purge at the BIA,’ the investigation had a ‘decidedly chilling 
effect on Immigration Judges’). 
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By way of example, immigrant children who are unaccompanied minors—those 
whose parents are either not in the United States or, if present, are incapable of providing 
care—have existing protections under immigration and family law.45  These children are 
outside of the traditional family.  True to the family privacy doctrine, without a parent, 
the federal government intervenes with a set of rules and procedures that shepherds the 
children from family court to immigration court, securing legal status.  Specifically, these 
children are appointed guardians ad litem (GALs) in immigration court, advocates who 
are the critical link in obtaining status for the undocumented children.   
GALs are truly a creature of a family law.  Their powers are broad but not clearly 
defined.  Their purpose is to serve the best interests of the child, a nebulous definition 
that is akin to the prosecutor’s duty to simply do justice.  Their duties are to advocate for 
a child, but cut off before and after the judicial proceeding at issue. The pliability of such 
a role permits individualized decisions to be rendered based on the fact-specific 
circumstances of the situation facing the child. 
To date, Congress has expressly provided the appointment of GALs for non-
citizen children who have no adults in the United States who can care for them.  It is the 
state intervention that gives the unaccompanied child a right to receive public benefits for 
food, shelter, and education.  The legal status gives the child a right to work and an 
ability to remain in the country.  In this context, the public status of the child is the way 
by which the child goes from unlawful foreigner without food, shelter, and income, to an 
admitted member of American society, capable of obtaining the means and ways that lead 
to self-sufficiency (and arguably self-realization). Why not provide GALs to citizen 
children whose parents are in immigration proceedings?  These citizen children are not at 
risk for deportation, but their parents are.  The reality is that then the minor children face 
the choice of being separated from their parents or remaining together at the expense of 
having substantially lessened life opportunities in a country that is foreign to the child.  
Instead of only having immigration law weigh in on the equities of the parent’s 
status, why shouldn’t family law be able to evaluate the impact that the deportation of a 
non-citizen parent will have on a citizen child?  When it is shown that the citizen child 
will be worse off in the country of the parent’s origin, it is time to recognize that the harm 
facing a citizen child may not simply be from neglect or abuse.  To the contrary, the most 
irreparable harm that some citizen children may face may be from the federal government 
effectuating a deportation order against his or her parents.  
The most notable benefits of GALs who appear in immigration proceedings is that 
they will provide counsel to the parents of citizens who are otherwise not represented.  
From data compiled over the past decade, the presence of counsel is a significant factor in 
non-citizen’s ability to remain in the United States. In cases involving unaccompanied 
                                                 
45 ‘[A]bandoned, abused, and neglected child migrants [may qualify for] . . . “Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status” (SIJS). This benefit, which is a pathway to legal permanent residence and citizenship, is the only 
area within federal immigration law that requires a state court to take action in order for immigration 
authorities to consider an individual's eligibility for relief.’  Laila L. Hlass, ‘States and Status: A Study of 
Geographical Disparities for Immigrant Youth’, Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 46, 2014, 66.  The estimated size 
of this population is approximately 1,120,000 children.  Ibid at 274 & n.37.  
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minors, those with attorneys were granted relief 73 per cent of the time and ordered 
removed 27 per cent of the time.  In cases without representation, those children were 
ordered removed 85 per cent of the time and granted relief 15 per cent of the time.46  
In the child welfare context, private attorneys are appointed in adoptions in which 
a state agency is terminating a parent’s rights.  But in private adoptions, the parties 
usually must fend without counsel.  States such as Massachusetts have recognized that 
‘the same fundamental, constitutionally protected interests are at stake’ in both types 
adoptions and have thus ordered the appointment of counsel to all.47  Extending GALs 
then to immigration proceedings has a foundation. 
However, sometimes under immigration law, the welfare of the citizen child is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the non-citizen parent is eligible for status.  In those 
situations, why cannot the GAL serve as the means by which the citizen child can enjoin 
the enforcement of a removal order against his or her parents. In 1998, the Fifth Circuit 
recognized a critical exception to Donovan v. City of Dallas’s anti-injunction rule, 
contemplating a circumstance when state proceedings may in fact enjoin federal ones.48  
Given that GALs would simply enjoin the enforcement of the deportation order until the 
child is 18 rather than extinguish it, this too appears to be a potential remedy available to 
citizen children whose parents are without immigration status. 
 
Citizen children with undocumented parents do not receive the same child welfare 
protections that arriving foreign nationals do.  They do not, because they are part of 
intact, functioning families in which their parents are married, able to financially support 
them, or both.  But for immigration, the citizen children are members of families 
deserving of privacy.  But the very privacy doctrine that leaves these intact, functioning 
families alone has left them fully vulnerable from needed and existing child welfare 
protections that may stop the parents’ deportations. 
For this reason, the cloak of privacy is no gift at all to citizen children whose 
parents are without status.  For those residing in these mixed-status families, it is the 
State intervention that is needed to level the imbalance present in immigration court.  
CONCLUSION 
                                                 
46 http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/371/. 
47 In re Adoption of Meaghan, 461 Mass. 1006, 1007, 961 N.E.2d 110, 113 (2012); see also Michael 
Levenson, ‘Court Stresses Rights of Adoptees in Contested Cases’, Boston Globe August 27, 2015 at 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/26/probate-chief-orders-review-adoption-
cases/9eVmVDElOTlROonUSn6KnO/story.html (discussing court order for ‘all pending private adoption 
cases be reviewed to ensure that children at the center of those disputes have attorneys appointed to 
represent their interests.’). 
48 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 
585, 596 (5th Cir. 1998) (‘[S]tate laws regulating the business of insurance may suspend federal remedies 
based on conflicting federal statutes—here, the FAA.’); Alan D. Hornstein & P. Michael Nagle, ‘State 
Court Power to Enjoin Federal Judicial Proceedings: Donovan v. City of Dallas Revisted’ Wash. U. L. Rev. 
60, 1, 3 (1982) (“there is no federal constitutional ban on state court injunctions against federal 
proceedings, pending or impending, once a state equity court determines that the federal court lacks 
jurisdiction”).  
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Citizen children—those in the functioning families—are left alone and as a result fend for 
themselves, against an oppressive federal system seeking to separate or exile the non-
citizen parent from the United States.  It is these children, those who are part of a 
functioning family that lack the needed protection of critical state laws that do help 
similarly-situated children in public families. 
Famigration—the indelible link between domestic family law and immigration 
law—offers the potential to transform the way in which immigration law operates.  For 
decades, Congress has directed immigration decisions to be based on substantive state 
family law’s definitions of spouse, parent, and child.  Now with Obergefell’s heightened 
protections, the right to be let alone can be remedied by a right to intervene.   
 
 
 
 
 
